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3rown has two faces:
i face of joy, hope, and the
romise of equal educational
)pportunity for every child and
i face of despair, hoplessness,
rnd racialized educational
:aste for American children
with darker skin.
In his Plessy dissen
by BRYAN K. FAIR Marshall Harlan sa
caste here. Our Co
color-blind and ne
wr many people, Bron v. Board tolerates classes a
of Education' is the most signifi-
cant U.S. Supreme Court decision of the 20th cen-
turNy As I mark its 50th anniversars, I am filled at once
with exuberance and frustration because Brown is vexing,
like so much of .Amnerican law, appearing to give substan-
tive reform with one hand only to take it away with the
other.
B13wn has two faces. One is a face ofjoy, hope, and the
promise of equal educational opportnity for ever, child.
The other is of continuing despair, hopelessness, and
racialized educational caste for American children with
darker skin. The realiy is that constitutional amendments
and federal statutes proscribing discrimination and assur-
ing equal protection of the laws have had the most modest
substantive impact, giving little relief from discrimination
or inequality These two aspects of Brown, its promise and
the reality, remain unreconciled throughout the coumntr
after a half-ceutry of litigation.
In Brown, on the one hand, I am reminded of Justice
John Marshall Harlan's majestic promise in his Plessy dis-
sent: "There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
i.Bro v.0 B rad (JJ id" ,',o yio,, 347 U.S. 54l3 1) [Brown IJ an( Br wa' v.
Board oJIducacti.a.. 319 tS. 29 (1955) [Bron ll].
2. Pes' ;. ]'-miu g on, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Haran, J., dissening).
Id.
t, Justice John




blind and neither knows nor toler-
ates classes among citizens."2 Of
course, Justice Harlan was simply wrong. From the begin-
ning of the American experiment, caste was extant: mas-
ters, indentured servants, subdued Native tribes, and
slaves defined the society. Moreover, the Crowns and mer-
chants of Europe sought to exploit labor and to extract
the Americas' resources for their personal ecotomic
gain. And that pattern of avarice and exploitation has
caused caste throughout every corner of the world,
including the ghettoes, barrios, and slums across the
United States and its territories. Nonetheless,Justice Har-
Ian's rhetorical panache provided a place fbr the aspira-
tions of those mired in caste. In his declaration of the
anticaste principle, he presented a constitutional path-
way up frotm and out of cumulative racial caste.
On the other hand, as I reflect on Brown's legacy I also
recall Justice Harlan's admonition, "The white race
deems itself to be the dominant race in this countr. And
so it. is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to
be for all time .. "' In Jistice Harlan's declaration of
racial supremacy, I locate one of the worst traditions of
American law. Harlan was not wrong here, but he did not
explain how whites had misused the law to abuse the civil
rights of colored people to establish white supremacy. He
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(lid not mention the legalized thefts
and government-sponsored brutality
against Native tribes, slaves, mulat-
tos, free persons of color, Chinese
and Japanese aliens, or Mexicans. He
did not recall the links among Mani-
fest Destiny, American imperialism,
and white supremacy.
White supremacy could not exist
without its codification in law. The
fallacy of white superiority would be
obvious without the manipulation of
the law. White hegemony is a conse-
quence of discriminatory laws, not
evolution. It is now impossible to
know what might have become of
the American experiment, absent
misuse of the law. But there are good
reasons to believe things would be
quite different.
Hope and promise
One face of Brown rests on a theory of
equal citizenship and dignity of all
persons. Brown overruled Pless y's lie,
heralding a new promise of equal
educ ational opportunity never
achieved in the era of separate but
equal. Brown held that separate edu-
cational systems for white and colored
children were inherently unequal,
violating the equal protection guaran-
tees of the Constitution.' The Court
underscored the importance of equal
educational opportunity in the life of
every child and the permanent status
injury to colored children froni state-
sponsored segregation.' The Court
recognized the implicit stamp of infe-
riority imposed on colored children
in a system that declared they were
unfit to associate with white children.
Most of all, the Court imposed on
school officials an affirnative duty to
remedy their constitutional viola-
tions, every root and branch.' This
aspect of Browr, reaffirms justice Har-
lan's anticaste declaration.
Likewise, this face of Brown is
Charles Sumner's heir As chief pro-
porn of the 14th Amendment,
Sumner declared his primary goal for
that amendment was to dismantle
black caste. Sunnner detested what he
called the essence of white
supremacy: "I am white, get away."'
So, when Justice Harlan exclaimed,
"There is no caste here." he was
affirming the anticaste moorings of
the 14th Amendment so ably champi-
oned by Sumner Sumner and Harlan
understood there was no consttu-
tional distinction between whites
telling colored people to get away
from the white sections of trains or
buses and whites telling colored peo-
ple to get away From public schools.
This anticaste principle is noble
and heroic. It. pledges corrective jus-
tice no matter how long delayed. It
insists that the law can do For equal-
ity what it did so effectively and long
for inequalit.
Educational disadvantage
But Brown has another prevailing
aspect, repeating a pattern of Ameri-
can law that is as old as the nation.
The Brown Court failed to lay bare
the white privilege inherent in all seg-
regated school systems. whether de
jure or de fiicto. The Court did not
discuss how segregation instilled
visions of white superiority in so
many children, nor (lid ii identify the
cumulative educational advantages
received by white children attending
better funded, better staffed, better
equipped schools. Brown's discourse
rendered the cumulative educational
advantages of whites legally invisible.
Its magical language appeared to give
so much, but in the end (lid not dis-
mantle educational caste for millions
of Americans with darker skin. In
addition to ordering an end to segre-
gation, the Court should have
ordered every school district sponsor-
ing segregation to eliminate all edu-
cational disadvantage caused by
segregation policies.
This pattern has been a corner-
stone of American law. Like the Dec-
laration of Independence, the
language in Brown suggested a com-
mitment to equal citizenship and
equal opportunity. Yet neither has
proven available for the protection
of all Americans. Like the U.S Con-
stitution, the language in Brown con-
tains euphemistic clauses to disguise
real motives and compromises
regarding the sacrifice of the rights
of colored people to benefit most
white ruling elites. For example,
although the Court trumpeted the
importance of education, it failed to
declare that every child had a finda-
mental ight to educationally efl-c-
tire schools. Moreover, despite the
constitutional violation, the Court
left it to each school district to act
with "all deliberate speed.""
Like Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation, the language in Brown
does not deliver the freedom of edu-
cationally effective schools to any col-
ored children. And like the 114th
Amendment.'s equal protection
clause, the language in Brown does
not ensure that the law of edica-
tional opportunity will extend to col-
ored children on the same basis as
white children. As with all the foun-
dational docuienis of American law,
Brown's spirit was muted by those
unwilling to extend the grace of the
American Creed to colored children.
Our rulers betrayed the Declaration
of Independence, the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and the 1l4th Amendment. And
they have betrayed Brown, translating
it into constitutional oblivion and
irrelevance.
Invoking ideals, not practices
I seek to re-center Brown's anticaste
moorings by heralding its equal citi-
zenship values. 'When I honor Brown,
I invoke the great American ideals,
not its practices; I invoke the Ameri-
can promise and dream, not their
betrayal. In Brown, the Court
reminded the nation that colored
children deserved what white chil-
dren took for granted: to be treated
by the govermnent as equal citizens
with equal status and equal educa-
tional opportuniv. The Court said it
was a betrayal of the Constitution to
treat colored children as outsiders,
4. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
5. Id. at 493-94.
6. Id. at 494.
7. Browv. I1, ?349 UT.S. at 299); Gmr(en v. 7ouni, Sch.
Bd 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); Swann C,.ha
IattcWlr,,hbetg' Bd. oqf duc., 402 U.S. L. 15 (197t ).
8. B ran K Fair, The Anatomy of Anerican Cosle.
t8 S. Lts U1). P'm .IL R ,v ?,817 390 '1999), cit-
ing ffefjyinpg on Amnesty Bill (Ci-fil Rights Ainrnd-
aa'nt), 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 15 1872)
(statement of Sen. Sumner), at 83.
9. [d. at 391-93.
10. Brown [, 347 US. at 494: "Segregation ... mn
[p ublic schools has a detrimental efrect upon' the
Colored children."
11. Brown If. 3419 1.S. at 301.
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unfit to associate with white chil-
dren. The Court said the exclusion
of colored children implied their
civil inferiority, their caste.' Surel;
the Court was correct that such a
message by the government is incon-
sistent with the equality guarantee of
the Constitution.
Ahen I celebrate Bivwn, I salute
the temerity of the families in all the
consolidated cases who courageously
stood with their lawyers against white
supremacy and educational tyranny."
I commend the NAXACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and
the brave public interest lawxers who
faced down assertions of white enti-
tlement. I give thanks to Charles H.
Houston, Thurgood Marshall, Julius
Chambers, Jack Greenberg, Elaine
Jones, and Ted Shaw, and all the spe-
cial counsel and scholars who have
explained why white superiority is a
legally constructed myth that under-
mines American nationhood.' I
praise Brown as a repudiation of the
nation's commitment to white hege-
mony. I honor Brown as a landmark
victory, knowing no amount of resist-
ance can unring its tone of equal
educational opportunity
Barely a shadow
Nonetheless, it is inescapable that
Brown's potential to dismantle educa-
tional caste in the United States has
not been fully realized at any grade
level. Racialized performance gaps
are persistent. From early education
through graduate or professional
training, there are huge racial dis-
parities in opportunities, achieve-
12. Brwn 1, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
13. Brown was a collection of five cases from
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kansas, South
Caroli!)a, and Virginia. &ee Brow, .347 t.S at
486.
14. Jack Greenberg, C S&t)Fs iN THi GO]rR'S:
H-OW A DiCATEi) BAND OF tWEffRS FOUGHT FOR
-;F (ixiIt Ri(aris REOU 0iN (New Ybrk: Basic
Books. 1994).
35. Glenn C. Lomiy, THi. As'ATOM% OF" Ra,. IAL
INt: UALY1ri 174-204 (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard
ti. Pres, 2002).
10. Oklahoma Cit, V. DodL, 1498 U.S. 237. 249-50
99]).
17. Frov, man v. Pitts, 503 t.S. 467, 491-92 (1992).
18. Alissouri u. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70. 98-101
,1995).
19. uI. a] .Sf-9).
20. Richard tnger, Siii y'srwP. 605-09 (New
York: NYU Press, i975).
21. . nins, 515 U.S at 86-90.
ment, and attainment.'" School seg-
regation is still a national crisis and
shame. Educational opportunity
depends more on gerrvniandered
zip codes and racialized property val-
ties than on capacity to learn. Many
colored children receive neither an
adequate nor equitable education,
leaving them with little means to
compete in the future. Moreover,
modest performance gaps on stan-
dardized tests are used against col-
ored children to track them into
second-caste schools or classrooms
throughout their training. And the
nation's flagship colleges and univer-
sities remain closed to all but a hand-
ful of colored students.
Thus Browri is today barely a
shadow of what it might have been.
The current Rehnquist majority has
missed no opportunity to interpret
Brown in a way that abandons the
same colored children whom a unan-
imous Court pledged to lift up 50
years ago. The Rehnquist majority
has made it easier for local officials
to avoid federal supervision of
schools. The Rehnquist majority
has made it more onerous for plain-
tiffs to establish links between his-
toric school segregation and school
segregation today.'' The Rehnquist
majority has insisted that federal
judges have quite limited equitable
powers, restricted to the narrowest
grounds of a constitutional violation,
with no systemic reform capaciyi
And the Rehnquist majori has held
that the affirmative duty to dismantle
the constitutional violation is only
"to the extent practicable.""
Thus, the real meaning of Brown
has been lost in its translation by the
Rehnquist majority. Brown simply
does not mean what the nation
thought and celebrated 50 years ago.
It does not guarantee equal educa-
tional opportunity. It does not ban
extant racial segregation. That
Brown s anticaste moorings have been
undervalued by the Rehnquist major-
ity is especially ironic if it is correct
that, as a law clerk in the 1950s for
justice Robert Jackson, Rehnquist
wrote a memo to Justice Jackson rec-
ommending that the principles of
Ple. should be affirmed in Bonmw.
21
Although Rehnquist has denied that
the memo reflected his views, perhaps
the most damning proof is Brown
undoing on his watch. The Rehnqnist
majority has ignored the extensive
roots and branches of segregation
that still remain, discounting their
connection to past segregation. And
the Court has increasingly restricted
the affirmative duty imposed on
school officials to remedy the stamus
injury to colored children caused by
segregation.21
In the process, the Court has made
American legal history irrelevant,
rendering white educational privi-
lege beyond serious critique or sub-
stantive reform. I am quite reluctant
to criticize Brown because such cri-
tiques can so easily be misconstrued
or misapplied. Brown was a great legal
victory against racial oppression. It
deserves reverence and praise, even if
the Court might have gone firther in
explaining its rationale and scope.
My critique is not of the Brown deci-
sion, but rather targets the sorry
judges, legislators, and school offi-
cials who sought ftom the beginning
to nullify its generative spirit. Rather
than embrace Brown's transfbrmative
power, its implicit declaration against
white supremacy and its promise of
equal dignity, those officials sought to
close public schools, to re-route pub-
lic funds to white flight private acade-
mies, to delay enforcement and
constitutional compliance, and, gen-
erally, to resist Brown's basic mandate
for equal educational opportunity.
With so many working against Bown
for so long, it is no wonder why so lit-
tle substantive progress has been
made. Those officials have repeatedly
violated their constitutional duty.
They have stolen life opportunities
and hopes and drcams of millions of
American citizens. Many officials
have proven to be enemies of equal-
ity and fairness, abusing the power of
the law for personal gain. They have
taken a constitutional mandate and
turned it against those most in need
of its benefits, repeating a pattern as
old as the nation.
Institutionall, the U .S. Supreme
Court deserves particular condemna-
tion. By insisting on its "all deliberate
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE 83
speed" language, the Court gave
already recalcitrant officials a legal
route to ignore Brown. for almost iwo
decadesY.2 By not elucidating the
white privilege inherent in segrega-
tion, the Court reified racial dispari-
ties in opportunity performance,
and attainment as normative. By fail-
ing to declare that education is a
fundamental right, the indispensa-
ble ingredient to the exercise of all
other fundamental constitutional
rights, the Court virtually assured the
permanence of racialized educa-
tional caste.
What might have been
To understand the magnitude of the
Court's retreat, one need only specu-
late briefly on what might have been
had the Court demonstrated the
same courage as the Brown plaintiffs.
The Court could have used Brown's
anuicaste principle to do so much
more than desegregate public
schools and open such public
accommodations as municipal parks,
swimming pools, and golf courses.
The Court could have imposed a
similar affirmative duty on govern-
merit officials to dismantle caste for
constitutional violations in voting,
employment, and housing, as well.
The Court could have held that the
government had an affirmative obli-
gation to dismantle every form of
caste that it helped create, wherever
it exists. There is no coherent consti-
tutional reason to distinguish one
form of caste from the others. The
Court could have affirmed Justice
Harlan's anticaste principle rather
than his declaration of the normativ-
ity of white hegemony. The Court
could have stated that white
supriemacy is not normal and that it
has had the blessings and aid of all
agents of American law to thrive and
will need the same comprehensive
antidote to end.
_Again, there is another inmistak-
able pattern here. just as Chief jus-
tice Roger Brooke Taney closed the
door on Americans with darker skin
in Dwd Scot!,-' and as Justice Henry
Brown shunned the dignity and rep-
utation of colored people in Plessy,
the Rehnquist majority has had the
last laugh, closing the most impor-
tant door of all, resuscitating a legal
regime under which colored people
have no rights that. whites are bound
to respect and where colored people
must cease being the special favorites
of the law. Colored people, again,
must forget the context of their lives,
stay in their place, and abandon
their hopes for corrective justice and
reparations. The Rehnquist majority
is not in session for such claims.
Undoing caste
My goal is to restore and reclaim
Brown's anticaste moorings, remind-
ing readers of the five centuries it
has taken to produce caste across the
globe." I seek to use the law to undo
caste. I propose to re-assert the anti-
caste principle, contextually, and to
use it for as long as it takes to dis-
mantle every shade of caste, even if it
takes another five centuries. I seek to
persuade five members of the U.S.
Supreme Court that the anticaste
principle offers the most coherent
reading of the Constitution's equal-
ity guarantee. whether the axis of
caste is race, gender, age, disability,
sexual orietation, wealth, or
another common basis for invidious
discriminatioti. Specifically, I seek to
replace the antidiscrimination equal-
ity theory with a broader anticaste
equality theory.
Urilike the antidiscrimination
principle employed by the Rehnquist
majority, which operates only
prospectively in search of bad actors,
the anticaste principle looks in both
directions, contextually, at our past
and its legacy, assigning to all agents
of government remedial obligations
for violating the equal citizenship
principle, no matter how ancient.
The anticaste principle says the gov-
ermnent cannot make some of us
strangers in our native land. The gov-
ernment cannot render some citi-
zens insiders and somne outsiders.
The government cannot establish
racial supremacy for Some and racial
inferiority for others. And where it.
has done so, it has a continuing affir-
niative duty to dismantle such caste,
eveiy root and branch. It has a con-
stintional oi)ligatiot to lift, those
mired in caste tip from their second-
class status. And when it undertakes
this constitutional duty, it cannot be
said to violate anyone's constitu-
tional rights since no provision of
the Constitution gives any persot) a
right to compel the government to
maintain caste in violation of the
equal citizenship principle.
The anticaste principle is counter-
majoritarian, protecting colored
people from the tyranny of the
maiority. The anticaste principle is
self-executing, circumscribing gov-
ernmental power to impose caste. It
also has a second face, requiring gov-
ernment to undo caste of its own cre-
ation. Every judge, legislator, and
public school official is oath-bound
to resist his or her worst impulses to
establish caste. And wvhen one fails,
as so many have done, the anticaste
principle compels that those
excluded be lifted up to equal citi-
zenship immediately and fully. jis-
tice Harlan was right: there is no caste
permitted he're. The Constitution has
not changed in relevant part since
Brown. What has changed is the
membership of the Court, as well as
its interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's equality guarantee.
The great American Creed shall
remain an empty promise so long as
the nation refuses to honor the high
road offered by the majestic anticaste
moorings of Brown. And we shall not
overcome, through Brown or othet-
wise, until the Court replaces its inef-
fectual antidiscrimination theory with
the anticaste principle. ,i
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